Know the fund's math
A fund needs a 3x return, so each bet has to plausibly return the whole fund. At $200M that means a $3B to $4B outcome. Look like that, or pick a smaller fund.
Run the numbers →What a venture fund is actually underwriting when it reads your deck, and how to fundraise the way you sell. From Collin Wallace's session with the StartX cohort.
Each of those two has to become a $3.6B company. Every pitch is judged against that.
You're running two businesses. One builds the product. The other sells equity, and its customers are investors. Segment them the way you segment customers.Collin's closing slide, paraphrased: "They're just like any other customer. They're only buying shares. They're not buying your product."
A fund needs a 3x return, so each bet has to plausibly return the whole fund. At $200M that means a $3B to $4B outcome. Look like that, or pick a smaller fund.
Run the numbers →Ask about check size, fund size, and where they are in the fund cycle. The partner's career stage and the LPs behind them decide a lot before you speak.
Check your fit →A story without numbers is a dream. Numbers without a story mean nothing. The same $3K of monthly revenue can sound like failure or like proof.
See both stories →Valuations rise because the odds of success rise, not because the market grew. Aim your proof points at the single biggest risk in your business.
The value equation →If they don't believe the market is big, they're not your investor. Generic passes are usually soft. Don't reshape your company to fit one fund.
Decode a pass →One partner sees 110 to 120 pitches a week, so who sent yours matters. A warm intro also shows you can work your network, which is how you'll hire and sell.
Map your network →"This is a thing I did not know very much about when I was a founder, and if I had, it would have changed a lot of how I pitched."
Collin walked through a mid-sized fund in round numbers. A $200M fund has to give its LPs back $600M net of fees, a 3x, to stay in business. The firm takes a 2% management fee plus 20% of the returns, so the portfolio really has to produce about $720M.
The fund buys about 20% of each company and expects that to dilute to 10% by exit. To earn $720M from 10% stakes, the portfolio has to be worth $7.2B. Twelve of twenty companies return nothing and six return 50 cents to a dollar, so nearly all of that comes from two companies.
Collin's round-number model, which ignores the small returns from the six middling companies. Hard tech and energy usually dilute more than 50%, which raises the bar further.
The most common reason a deal dies before a partner meeting: on the surface, it doesn't look like it can reach $3B to $4B.
A $1B fund needs outcomes about five times larger. To a $50M fund, a $1B sale is a huge win. Pick the fund whose win looks like yours.
Collin's shorthand for a $3.6B company: roughly $100M in annual revenue and still growing 20 to 30% a year.
Three facts tell you how aggressive or conservative an investor will be. Ask for them early, the way you'd qualify a sales lead.
Tells you how much ownership they need and whether your round fits them.
Sets the size of outcome that counts as a win, which sets how big you need to look.
Early funds can wait for slow returns. A fund five years in can't take a ten-year bet.
LPs expect the first 1x back in about eight years and the second by year ten. Everything after comes whenever it comes. Collin's own fund closed in January and is about 20% deployed, so fast or slow deals both work. "If you were raising from us in November of last year, it would have been a very different conversation." A great company can get a no just because it doesn't fit the clock.
You pitch a person, not a firm. Where that person is in their career shapes what they can say yes to.
Has to find contrarian bets and be right. "If it's consensus, it's not compelling for your partners."
Lead with your non-obvious insight.
Wants deals everyone can see working, with other known names around them. Conservative.
Lead with clear milestones, traction, and who else is in.
Has made their money. Backs what interests them and founders they enjoy.
Lead with the relationship and what excites them.
A fund behaves like its LPs. A pension has fixed payouts every year and needs predictable timing. A family office or foundation cares about the size of the return, not the date. Some LPs rule out whole categories: Collin's fund has religious-institution LPs who won't back gambling, alcohol, or other vices. Another founder was turned down because the LPs had been burned in an industry the investor wrongly assumed he served. A lot of no's have nothing to do with how good the business is.
A rule of thumb built from the session's numbers: each winner needs to be worth about 18 times the fund (3x net, about 20% carry, 10% ownership at exit, two winners). Firms differ, so use it to sort your list, not to decide for you.
A great pitch has both. How much each one weighs changes as the company grows.
"A really great opportunity to fundraise. People are going to be receptive."
Metrics with no context. The investor fills in the story, and usually not in your favor.
"Very entertaining," but nothing backs it up. Works only at the very first round.
Nothing to believe and nothing to check.
"We've been building the product and we've crossed $3,000 in monthly recurring revenue."
What the investor hears: this team could earn half a million a year consulting. $3K a month isn't meaningful.
"We haven't optimized for revenue or gone after our key markets yet, and design partners and pilots already pay us $3,000 a month because they don't want it to go away."
Same number, now read as proof that customers value it.
"We're really smart, we did great things before, give us money to chase this." Weight on story, because the metrics aren't significant yet.
"What did you do with the money you got, and give me the case for more."
Financials lead. The story still matters, but it isn't the most compelling part.
"When we value a company, we're basically doing an expected value calculation."
Collin's example: a $10B opportunity with a 1% chance is a $100M business. In the short run, valuations rise because the second number goes up, not the first.
Your job between rounds is to take the biggest risks off the table: show you can execute, that unit economics work, that customer acquisition costs come down, that you can hire and keep great people. Sometimes that means proving people will pay, but not always.
In AI the main risk has moved. It used to be "can they build it?" Now it's usually "is there a business model, and will people pay enough?" Collin's example: Character AI had huge demand and the tech worked, but the business model didn't hold up.
"Two proof points would be way more valuable to me than 25 LOIs that show customers want to buy a thing they'd obviously buy if it works."Collin, on a chip startup whose real risk is whether the chip can be built at all
People care and will engage: design partners, early users, kind words, even if they pay little.
Prove: they want itYou can get paid, in a controlled setting: one market, one region, one segment.
Prove: they payValue and payment are proven. Now raise to do much more of it.
Prove: it repeatsKeep scaling, or start the next product once the first runs out of room.
Prove: it compounds"I don't expect you to raise pre-seed and come out the other side making $10 million a year." Explain what this round's money will prove, in these terms. Round sizes vary wildly (Collin recently saw a $600M "pre-seed"), so the milestones are a better guide than the dollar amounts.
"I think you can waste a tremendous amount of time trying to convince people who don't believe what you believe."
Can it produce returns that matter to this fund?
Can these people create that value?
The right capital structure, relationships, and culture to cross the finish line.
If an investor is stuck on question one, move on. A founder in the room had a partner value their company at $50M at scale, even though incumbents in the space are worth over $10B. Collin's answer: "That sounds like they're not your investor." Spend your time with people who already believe the market is big and are only asking whether you're the team.
Once they've decided no, telling you the real reason does nothing for them. They're limiting downside and keeping the door open in case you take off. One soft pass means little. The same soft pass from many investors means something in the business is scaring them: the risk doesn't seem worth the return compared with their other options.
They hold 25 to 30 bets and need two to work. You have one company. Their reasons to push you differ from yours. Change your plan only if an honest conversation shows you a bigger opportunity you actually believe in.
Pitching what a fund wants to hear is catfishing your future partner. "That's just a pretty miserable decade."
There are about 9,000 VCs and capital is fungible. "The scarce resource here is my team, my insight, my context, my journey." Remember it, and don't be a jerk about it.
"The idea that we are king and queen makers is just a fantasy." A brand-name check doesn't make you succeed.
A $100M or $500M acquisition is great for you and uses up one of a large fund's twenty shots. To a big fund, a founder aiming for an early sale is an easy no, "even if it's a great business." If that's your plan, look for smaller funds built so that outcome counts as a win, and don't lead with the exit when talking to investors whose math doesn't fit it.
"You'll find you're closer to a lot of these people than you might realize."
Pitches one partner at a mid-sized firm sees each week, from accelerators, universities, and portfolio founders.
VCs out there. If one doesn't believe in your market, there are plenty more.
A good VC's hit rate. An exceptional one is just over 2.
Cold outreach and inbound forms do work sometimes. Collin pointed to Stanford professor Ilya Strebulaev's research showing cold emails convert at a low but real rate. A quiet inbox means the channel is weak, not your company. Two things work against it: forms let firms collect decks for free, and the volume pushes partners to sort by who sent it. "There's a set of folks where if they send you something, it makes the top of my list."
The deeper reason: the warm intro is a test you're already taking. Raising money solves a cash problem and immediately gives you a people problem: hiring, selling, getting customers to vouch for you. How well you work your network to reach an investor is a preview of how well you'll do all of that.
Add former colleagues and classmates and the number grows fast. At pre-seed, "investor" also means the person deciding between a new car for their kid, a horse, and $50K into a possible cancer breakthrough. "There's a million potential investors in California alone."
investors one introduction away
Neutral dots are founders, orange dots are investors (up to 240 shown).
Find founders who share your values and have raised from the investor you want. Ask for an intro, then talk fund size and check size. "We're all part of the same club."
A fund's values often aren't visible from outside. If the people around an investor share your values, the investor probably does too. "Not 100%, but pretty high fidelity."
Investors wait, because waiting buys information. What gets them off the fence is the fear that the price will jump before they're in. "We have multiple term sheets," "we close on this date," and "others are interested" all say the same thing: wait too long and you miss this price.
Some investors back an alma mater, a former employer, or a type of expert, and little else. If you fit their filter, start there. Names mentioned in the session (check them yourself before reaching out):
The cohort's questions, with names and company figures left out.
The underlying math is the same, but it's harder to meet. The 20%-to-10% dilution assumption usually breaks: these companies need more money and more time, and each round dilutes early investors further.
Look for funds built for it, whose LPs are comfortable with long timelines (more like a family office than a pension). Go in saying plainly that it will take longer and cost more, and still show how the math works.
The first 1x back by about year eight, the second by year ten, then whenever possible. That's why you ask where an investor is in their fund. A slow-returning deal can be a yes from a new fund and a no from one five years in.
You don't. "That sounds like they're not your investor." It's fair to doubt your team. Doubting the market means a sorting problem at the top of your funnel. Write down the objection, then move on and don't treat it as a verdict on the business.
Collin's own experience as a founder: he once spent months arguing with investors over whether phones on different carriers could talk to each other. They turned out to be wrong, and the arguments were still time he didn't get back.
Ask 9,000 VCs and you'll get many answers. Some only want triple-double or faster. Collin's firm judges "a lot like applying to college," looking at the whole picture: great metrics with an average team can work, and so can a great team with no revenue yet that is clearly reducing its key risks.
Underneath, it's the expected-value calculation. Show progress on the risk that matters most in your business.
Both, because they're different customers. Collin's comparison: if half your buyers wanted minivans and half wanted sports cars, you wouldn't be confused, you'd segment them. Do investor discovery: find which parts of your story and metrics land with which kind of investor (domain-expert funds, school-affiliated funds, sub-$50M funds, corporate VCs), then fill your funnel with that kind. "You'll close very quickly and very easily."
No. "If Tesla only wants you to raise a hundred million and you think you need ten, they're just not your investors." A famous name on your cap table doesn't make you succeed. The exception is when an honest conversation shows you a bigger opportunity that can put more capital to work and you actually believe it. Otherwise you're catfishing a ten-year partner.
Probably, at first glance. The better question is where your biggest risk is, and whether your proof points address it. For a chip company the risk is whether it can be built and manufactured, not whether anyone would buy a chip that's 100 times better. One or two proof points on the real risk beat 25 LOIs on the obvious one.
Collin suspected the cap wasn't the real issue. Those are soft passes, and when every bucket passes for opposite reasons, something else is worrying investors. In this case he pointed to the category: public comparables trading at weak multiples make every deal in the space harder. He offered to dig into it one-on-one.
Don't make it your pitch to investors whose math doesn't fit. A $3.6B company is roughly $100M a year in revenue still growing 20 to 30%. A sale at $100M to $500M is great for you and uses up one of their twenty shots. If early exits are the plan, look for smaller funds built so those outcomes count as wins.
No, it's the channel. Cold works at a low rate, forms cost the firm nothing to collect, and partners sort over 100 inbound pitches a week by who referred them. Put your time into your network: at around 30 founders who each know about 5 investors, the cohort alone is one introduction from roughly 150.
Labhesh raised this in the room: a tool, even an MCP server, that reads your deck and finds the right investors and the warm path to them, aware of fund cycle and check size. Another founder noted at least two tools already try something like this.
Collin agreed the process "has been a very manual process for a long time," with a caution: many of the attributes that matter aren't visible from outside, such as LP mandates, fund timing, and values. Signal from other founders is still the best filter.
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